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Abstract 
A power market with non-convexities may not have an equilibrium price for power that 
provides economic stability of the centralized dispatch outcome. In this case, the market players 
are entitled to receive the uplift payments that compensate the economic profit lost when following 
the centralized dispatch. We consider a special class of the (possibly non-linear) redundant 
constraints that are redundant not only on the feasible set of the centralized dispatch optimization 
problem (and, therefore, do not change the centralized dispatch outcome) but also on the larger set 
obtained when the power balance constraint is relaxed. We show that the Lagrangian relaxation of 
these redundant constraints may reduce the uplift payments without changing the duality gap. For 
any given market price (or a pricing algorithm that sets the producer revenue as a function of its 
output volume) in a uninode multi-period power market with fixed load, we explicitly construct a 
family of the redundant constraints that do not change the maximum profit of the producer and 
result in zero uplift payment. We show that the introduction and subsequent Lagrangian relaxation 
of just one redundant constraint in the centralized dispatch problem suffice to eliminate the uplift 
payments for all the producers. In the case of the convex hull pricing method, the introduction of 
these redundant constraints affects neither the duality gap nor the market price for power. The 
results can be straightforwardly generalized to a power market with the price-sensitive load. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Many deregulated electric power markets are centrally coordinated with generating 
unit dispatch and load schedule obtained from a bid-based security-constrained 
centralized dispatch optimization problem. The solution of this problem also produces 
the system marginal price (or locational marginal prices) for power [1]-[3]. If the 
optimization problem is convex, then the marginal price is an equilibrium price for 
power and no market player (acting as a price-taker) has the economic incentives to 
deviate from the centralized dispatch outcome. However, if the optimization problem 
is not convex, then the marginal price may fail to ensure the economic equilibrium of 
the centralized dispatch outcome since the non-convex components of the generator 
and consumer bids are not affecting the value of the marginal price. The non-
convexities usually originate both from the supply side (due to the no-load cost, start-
up cost, non-zero minimum output limits, integral commitment decision variables, 
minimum up/down times, etc.) and from the flexible demand side due to discrete and 
minimum power consumption levels [5]. In fact, in case of the non-convex centralized 
dispatch optimization problem, an equilibrium market price may not exist at all and 
some other pricing approach has to be implemented to ensure the economic stability 
of the centralized dispatch outcome [4]. Recently, a number of pricing methods for the 
centrally coordinated markets with non-convexities have been developed, [6]-[24]. 
The new service (a unit being online) and the corresponding unit specific prices were 
introduced in [6] by constraining the integral status variables to their optimal values 
obtained from the centralized dispatch. However, these new prices can be negative for 
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some units and the method is similar to pay-as-bid pricing. If only the positive prices 
are applied to allow generators to retain their profits, then the competitive equilibrium 
is not achieved. In [7], [8] this method was further improved to generate more stable 
prices by adding extra constraints to the reformulated optimization problem that also 
set certain continuous variables to their optimal values. The nonlinear (discriminatory) 
pricing methods for power with market player specific prices were developed in [9]-
[12]. The nonlinear pricing in the form of the generalized uplift functions that 
includes generators as well as consumers in the lost profit compensation and ensures 
zero net uplift at the market was proposed in [13]-[15]. The minimum zero-sum uplift 
pricing approach that increases the price above marginal cost and transfers all the 
additional payments (that the profitable suppliers receive as a result of the price 
increase) to the unprofitable suppliers to make them whole in the form of internal 
zero-sum uplifts was introduced in [16]. In [17] a primal-dual approach was proposed 
to find the market prices that minimize the social welfare reduction due to schedules 
inconsistency and ensure non-negative generator profits. However, in this approach, 
some of the lost profit may not be compensated to generators and the competitive 
equilibrium at the centralized dispatch solution is not achieved. In [18] a semi-
Lagrangian relaxation approach was developed to find a uniform market price that 
produces the same solution as the original centralized dispatch problem while 
ensuring the non-confiscatory pricing for generators. A zero-sum uplift pricing 
scheme that minimizes the maximum contribution to the uplift financing in a market 
with price-sensitive load was suggested in [19]. In the case of no price-sensitive load, 
this approach produces the market price equal the maximum average cost of the 
generators. The minimum-uplift pricing (also known as the convex hull pricing) was 
proposed in [20]-[22] and yields a uniform market price that minimizes the total uplift 
payment needed to ensure the economic stability of the centralized dispatch outcome. 
In this approach, at a given market price each market player is compensated the lost 
profit calculated as the difference between the maximum value of its profit function 
on the market player private feasible set and its profit received when following the 
centralized dispatch. Since the uplift payments distort the uniform market pricing and 
decrease the transparency of the market pricing method, it is critical to reduce these 
payments. In [23], [24] it was proposed to modify the minimum-uplift pricing method 
by excluding the power volumes that are not attainable in a decentralized market from 
the lost profit calculation since the opportunities to supply these volumes are not 
forgone by a market player when accepting the centralized dispatch outcome. This 
approach results in the lower (or equal) total uplift payment compared to the 
minimum-uplift pricing algorithm.  
For the convex hull pricing method, in [25] it was suggested to reduce the total 
uplift payment, which compensates the lost profit of the market players, at the 
expense of having one affine redundant constraint introduced in the centralized 
dispatch optimization problem. This new constraint depends on the unit status 
variables of all generators and leads to the introduction of the new service (a unit 
being online) and the associated price in addition to the market price for power, which 
can be viewed as the producer revenue function amendments. The linearity of the 
redundant constraint ensures that the duality gap, introduced by the Lagrangian 
relaxation of both the power balance constraint and the new constraint, is equal to that 
in the absence of the redundant constraint [26]. However, introduction and subsequent 
dualization of the new constraint entails that the duality gap may no longer coincide 
with the total uplift, which is potentially reduced but generally still non-zero. 
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In this paper, we study the problem of the total uplift (lost profit) reduction in 
a general pricing setting, which fixes the producer (consumer) revenue (cost) as a 
function of its status-output (consumption) variables, by introduction of the redundant 
constraints and the corresponding non-negative amendments to the revenue (cost) 
functions. Thus, our study is also applicable to the cases with uniform pricing for 
power (such as marginal pricing, convex hull pricing) and discriminatory (non-linear) 
pricing with the uplift payments. For simplicity, we consider a multi-period uninode 
power market with the fixed load. The analysis and the results can be easily translated 
to markets with price-sensitive demand. To simplify the notations, we assume that 
each producer operates just one generating unit. 
We consider a special type of the redundant constraints – the constraints that 
hold not only on the feasible set of the centralized dispatch optimization problem but 
also on the larger set obtained by relaxing the power balance constraint. The 
redundant constraints under consideration are introduced in the market player 
individual profit optimization problems. Therefore, we require that each constraint 
depends on just one producer status-output variable. We show that it suffices to 
consider only this class of the redundant constraints to fully absorb the uplift payment 
of a producer (thus, resulting in zero uplift payment) and find the general form 
expression for the corresponding revenue amendment function for the producer. This 
function satisfies the following three properties: it is non-negative on the producer 
private feasible set, makes no contribution to the producer maximum profit, and yields 
zero uplift payment for the producer. For the uniform market price, we show that just 
one redundant constraint, which is the sum (over all the producers) of these properly 
rescaled redundant constraints) introduced directly in the centralized dispatch 
optimization problem suffices to produce zero total uplift. If the uniform market price 
for power is set by the convex hull pricing method, the dualization of both the power 
balance constraint and the new (redundant) constraint results in the same set of the 
market prices and the same maximum profit for each producer but gives zero total 
uplift.   
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate the conditions on 
the revenue amendment function that is non-negative on the producer private feasible 
set, leaves the producer maximum profit unaffected, and fully absorbs the uplift 
payment. In Section 3 we introduce the redundant constraints and study their relations 
with the revenue amendment functions and the uplift reduction problem. In Section 4 
we formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for a given set of the redundant 
constraints and the associated multipliers to produce zero uplift. The general form 
expression for the revenue amendment function that satisfies the three 
abovementioned properties is obtained in Section 5. In Section 6 we apply the 
proposal to power markets with marginal pricing, while the application of the method 
to a producer with linear cost function is given in Section 7. In Section 8 we construct 
the revenue amendment functions and the corresponding redundant constraints in a 
numerical example. The results are summarized in Section 9. Some mathematical 
aspects of the redundant constraints are summarized in the Appendix. 
 
II. The problem formulation 
Consider T -period uninode power market with the fixed load d , TR 0d , with || I  
producers, where  ||   denotes cardinality of a set. For each producer  Ii  at time 
period },..,1{ Tt , let tiu  and 
t
ig  denote the commitment and output variables, 
respectively. Introduce ),..,( 1 Tiii ggg , ),..,(
1 T
iii uuu , ),(
t
i
t
i
t
i gux  , ),..,(
1 T
iii xxx ,  
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),.., ||1 Ix(xx  . Let iX  be the producer i  private feasible set (which is assumed to be 
nonempty and compact) and )( iiC x  be the offer cost function of the producer i . The 
centralized dispatch problem has the form 







Ii
ii
IiX
Cf
Ii
i
ii
)(min
,
* x
dg
x
   (1) 
The feasible set of (1) is assumed to be nonempty and compact. Let ),.., ||
*
1
* *
Ix(xx   
denote an optimal point of (1). Although we consider a centrally coordinated power 
market with a fixed load, it is straightforward to include the price-sensitive demand in 
our analyses.  For a given price p , TRp , the standard expression for the producer i  
profit function is given by )(),(),( .. iii
st
ii
st
i CR xxpxp   with the revenue function 
),(. i
st
iR xp  usually expressed as ii
st
iR gpxp
T. ),(  . However, our analysis is performed 
for the most general form
2
 of the function ),(. i
st
iR xp , unless explicitly stated 
otherwise. The generator status-output value determined by the centralized dispatch 
optimization problem results in the profit )(),()( *.*. *iii
st
i
st
i CR xxpp  . Given the price p , 
the maximum producer’s profit is ),(max)( .. i
st
i
X
st
i
ii
xpp
x


  . If )()( *.. pp sti
st
i  
 , then 
the producer has economic incentives to adjust its output volumes to attain the 
maximum profit and deviate from the centralized dispatch outcome. The standard 
procedure utilized to eliminate such incentives is to pay the producer the uplift in the 
amount of  )()( *.. pp sti
st
i  
  if it follows the centralized dispatch outcome within a set 
tolerance band. In this case, the producer receives the profit )(. psti  when supplying 
the output *
ig . (We make the usual assumption that a generator decides to deviate 
from *
ix  only if it receives a higher profit when having a different output volume. This 
means that if both *
ix  and ix   maximize the generator profit, then it will not deviate 
from *
ix  to ix  .) The uplift payment )()(
*.. pp sti
st
i  
  can be viewed as the cost of the 
commitment ticket payable to the generator i  for following the centralized dispatch 
[20]-[22]. If the price-sensitive demand is present in the system, then such a 
compensation mechanism should be applied to the demand side as well. (We note that 
for some ),(. i
st
iR xp , in particular ii
st
iR gpxp
T. ),(  , if the total uplift payment is non-zero 
and all the consumers submit only the price-sensitive bids, then this leads to the 
budget-balancing problem as the total uplift payment (if non-zero) exceeds the 
amount that can be collected from the market players provided that no consumer 
(producer) can be charged (paid) above (below) its bid cost. In the present paper, we 
do not address this problem.) The uplift payment in the amount of )()( *.. pp sti
st
i  
  
can be expressed as the generator revenue function amendment of the form 
)]()([ *..
, *
pp
ii xx
st
i
st
i  
  with a function *, ii xx
  defined as 1*, ii xx
  for *i ixx  , and 
0*, ii xx
 , otherwise3. Clearly, *** ,,, iiiiii gguuxx
  . 
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 If ),(. i
st
iR xp  is some general function of p  and ix , then p  denotes a set of parameters utilized in 
a given pricing method. 
3
 If the unit status is uniquely set by its output, then instead of *, ii xx
  it is sufficient to use *, ii gg
 . 
Likewise, if the unit output is uniquely set by its status, it suffices to use *, ii uu
  instead of *, ii xx
 . The 
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Let us amend the revenue term in the expression for the profit function by 
adding some real-valued function ),( iiN xp  defined on i
T XR  . This results in the 
profit function of the form 
),(),()(),(),()( .. iii
st
iiiiii
st
iii NCNR xpxpxxpxpxp,   . Hence, the 
generator’s profit, obtained when it follows the centralized dispatch outcome, is 
),(),()( .* *ii
*
i
st
ii N xpxpp  , while the maximum value of the generator profit function 
equals ),(max)( ii
X
i
ii
xpp
x


  . In this case, the uplift is expressed as )()( * pp ii  
 . We 
impose the following three conditions on ),( iiN xp . First, the introduction of ),( iiN xp  
should not change the maximum generator profit in the decentralized dispatch 
problem: 
),(max)(. ii
X
st
i
ii
xpp
x


  .  (2) 
Second, we impose zero uplift condition: 
)()( *. pp i
st
i  
 .                      (3) 
We also require that the new term in the generator revenue function is a rewarding, 
not penalizing, addition to the standard revenue function ),(. i
st
iR xp : 
0),( iiN xp , ii Xx ,    (4) 
We observe that if the uplift payment is not needed (i.e. )()( *.. pp sti
st
i  
 ), then (2) – 
(4) generally do not yield 0),( iiN xp , ii Xx , as the profit function may still be 
amended with no effect on its maximum value and its value at *
i
x . This suggests 
imposing an additional condition 
0),( iiN xp , ii Xx , if )()(
*.. pp sti
st
i  
 . (5) 
However, this condition can be easily satisfied since given any ),( iiN xp  that satisfies 
(2) – (4) for ),( iiN xp , the function ),()]()([),(
*..
ii
st
i
st
iii NN xpppxp 
  , with the 
step-function )(z  defined as 1)( z  for 0z  and 0)( z  for 0z , satisfies 
(2) – (5). Therefore, in what follows, we focus on (2) – (4). Since the total profit 
(including the uplift payment) received by each generator still equals )(. psti , it is 
not affected by ),( iiN xp . Thus, the introduction of ),( iiN xp  does not address the 
abovementioned issue of revenue adequacy problem relevant for systems with no 
fixed load. Also, (2) and (4) entail 
0),( st.
i
N xp , ),(maxarg . i
st
i
X
st.
ii
i
xpx
x


  , (6) 
which gives ),(maxarg),(maxarg . ii
X
i
st
i
X iiii
xpxp
xx


 . Also, (2) is equivalent to   
)(),( . pxp  stiii  , ii Xx ,  (7) 
)(),( . pxp  stiii  , for some ii Xx .  (8) 
The obvious choice for 
i
x  is *
ii
xx  , which means that the set of (2) and (3) is 
equivalent to a set of (3) and (7). Another natural choice for 
i
x  is  st.
ii
xx , thus (2) 
is equivalent to a set of (6) and (7). The conditions (2) and (3) imply 
),(maxarg ii
X
*
ii
i
xpx
x


 , which has the following implication.  
                                                                                                                                            
latter possibility is realized, for example, for a block-loaded unit with the output rate uniquely set by 
the unit’s status. 
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Proposition 1 Let TRp  and ii
st
iR gpxp
T. ),(  , Ii . If ),(maxarg ii
X
*
ii
i
xpx
x


 , Ii , 
then *x  is an optimal point of the following amended centralized dispatch problem  
)(min
,
x
dg
x
N
IiX
f
Ii
i
ii




 (9) 
with the objective function 


Ii
iiiiN NCf )],()([)( xpxx , where p  is treated as the 
fixed external parameter. Moreover, there is a strong duality between (9) and its dual 
obtained from the Lagrangian relaxation of the power balance constraint with p  
being an optimal value of the dual variable.  
Proof. Consider the Lagrangian function )()(),( xg-dqxq T N
Ii
i fL  

 with a vector 
of multipliers TRq  and define the dual function ),(min)(
,
xqq
x
Lf
IiX
N
ii 
  . For pq  , 
we have 


 
Ii
ii
X
N
ii
f ),(max)( xpdpp
x
T  . The condition ),(maxarg ii
X
*
ii
i
xpx
x


 , Ii , 
entails ),()( *xpp LfN 
 . From )(),( *xxp * NfL   we conclude that )()(
*xp NN ff 
  - the 
value of the dual function at pq  , which is feasible in the dual problem, equals the 
value of the primal problem objective function at *xx  , which is feasible in the 
primal problem (9). Consequently, we have a strong duality, and )( * px ,  is an optimal 
primal-dual pair. Proposition is proved. 
If conditions of Proposition 1 hold, then p  is a uniform equilibrium price for 
each generator. Proposition 1 can be straightforwardly generalized to a power 
market with the price-sensitive consumer bids. In this case, the existence of an 
equilibrium price does not eliminate the abovementioned budget-balancing problem 
since (due to the amendments of the consumer cost functions/producer revenue 
functions) the sum of the consumer payments is at most dpT , while the sum of the 
generator revenues is at least dpT .  
In the next section, we study the relation between ),( iiN xp  satisfying (2) – (4) 
and the uplift minimization problem.  
 
III. Utilizing the redundant constraints for the uplift payment reduction 
Let us consider some real-valued functions ),( i
l
i
i xp , ii Ll  , |}|,..,2,1{ ii LL  , 
that are defined on RXR i
T   and satisfy 0),( i
l
i
i xp , ii Xx , 
TRp , 
ii Ll  . 
Introduce a vector function )),(),..,,((),( ||1 i
L
iiiii
i xpxpxp   . Thus, 0),( ii xp , 
ii Xx , 
TRp , where we adopt a convention that a vector is non-negative (non-
positive) if all of its components are non-negative (non-positive). Clearly, with 
regard to the centralized dispatch problem (1), the constraints 0),( ii xp , ii Xx , 
are redundant since they are satisfied on  . However, we emphasize that these 
constraints also hold on a set i
Ii
X

 , which contains   as a subset. This means that 
they belong to a special type of the redundant constraints that hold even if the power 
balance constraint is removed from the constraint set of (1). (We note that the 
introduction of the extra copies of generator private equality and/or inequality 
constraints, which define its private feasible set, also produces this type of redundant 
constraints.) Among the redundant constraints introduced above there could be the 
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constraints that hold on i
Ii
X

  as equalities (such as 00  ,   01 titi uu ) or as strong 
inequalities (for example, 01 , 01
T
 ii gg )  - below we show that these kinds 
of the redundant constraints can be discarded as they do not affect the uplift 
payment. Consider the optimization problem 
),(max
0),(
ii
X
ii
ii
xp
xp
x

 

, (10) 
which is equivalent to ),(max ii
X ii
xp
x


, therefore, ),(max)(
0),(
.
ii
X
st
i
ii
ii
xpp
xp
x

 

  . Let us 
apply the Lagrangian relaxation procedure to the constraints 0),( ii xp  and define 
the Lagrangian function ),(),(),(
.
ii
T
ii
st
iiii xpxpxp,    with the associated || iL -
dimensional vector of the non-negative multipliers 0i . Clearly, ),( iii xp,  is the 
profit function amended by the non-negative term ),( ii
T
i xp . Define 
),,(max)( iii
X
ii
ii
xpp,
x


  . Since ),( iii xp,  is linear in i , the function )( ii  p,
  is 
convex in i . The problem that is dual to (10) reads: 
)(min
0
ii
i


p,

. (11) 
Proposition 2. There is a strong duality between (10) and (11): 
)(min)(
0
.
ii
st
i
i


p,p 

  .  (12) 
Proof. Since ),,(),(. iiii
st
i xpxp   , ii Xx , 0 i , we have 
)(),,(max),(max .. iiiii
X
i
st
i
X
st
i
iiii
 p,xpxp
xx


  , 0 i . Hence, )(min
0
.
ii
st
i
i


p,

  . 
Applying 

 .
0
)0()(min stiiii
i


p,p, , we obtain )(min
0
.
ii
st
i
i


p,

  . Proposition is 
proved. 
If 
ii
st
iR gpxp
T. ),(  , Ii , with  a market price p  obtained using the convex hull 
pricing method, the same reasoning used to prove Proposition 2 can be applied to the 
dual problem obtained from (1) by the Lagrangian relaxation of the power balance 
constraint. Since the redundant constraints under consideration are redundant not 
only on   but also on i
Ii
X

 , the subsequent dualization of these redundant 
constraints do not affect the duality gap already introduced by dualization of the 
power balance constraint. Dependence of ),( ii xp  on p  implies that these constraints 
can be introduced in the dual to the centralized dispatch problem (1) in two different 
ways. First, 0),( ii xp  can be added to the constraint set of (1) with some fixed 
value of p , which is treated as constant in both the primal (1) and the dual problems. 
Second, the set of constraints 0),( ii xp  can be introduced after the power balance 
constraint is relaxed with p  in ),( ii xp  being identified as the multiplier to the 
power balance constraint in the dual problem (in this case, the dual function to be 
optimized over p  and i  is generally non-convex in p , but the convexity is restored 
after optimization over i ). In either way, the introduction and subsequent 
dualization of 0),( ii xp  (together with the power balance constraint) do not affect 
the duality gap between (1) and its dual.  
In [26] it has been shown that dualization of the affine redundant constraints 
together with the set of the original constraints of a primal problem results in the 
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same value of the duality gap that emerges from dualization of the original 
constraints of the primal problem (in our case, this is the power balance constraint), 
while introduction and dualization of the non-affine redundant constraints may 
change the value of the dual problem and, hence, affect the duality gap. Although 
the redundant constraints studied in the present paper are generally non-affine, they 
do not change the duality gap. The reason is that we deal with a special type of 
redundant constraints: these constraints hold on i
Ii
X

 , not just on  , and Proposition 
2 implies that these (possible non-affine) redundant constraints also do not change 
the duality gap. Thus, the dualization of the redundant constraints, which belong to 
the specified type, do not affect the value of the dual problem and the duality gap. 
Let us define a set )(minarg)(
0
ii
R
i
iL
i
M 

p,p 



 . Clearly, the set )(piM  generally 
depends on both the choice of ),( ii xp  and the price p . Since )( ii  p,
  is a convex 
function, the set )(piM  is a closed convex set. Also, (12) entails that )(}0{ p
 iM , 
which gives that the set )(piM  is nonempty. Due to 0),( ii xp , ii Xx , and 0i , 
we have }),(),(),(;0|{)( .. ii
st
ii
st
iii
T
iiii XM 
 xpxpxpp  . 
Proposition 2 implies that if )(p  ii M , then the expression ),( ii
T
i xp
  
satisfies conditions (2) and (4) for ),( iiN xp . From (12) we also have a condition on 
),( ii
T
i xp

 that is equivalent to (6): 
0),(  st.li
l
i i
ii xp , ),(maxarg . i
st
i
X
st.
ii
i
xpx
x


  , ii Ll  . (13) 
Clearly, if for some 
ii Ll   we have 0),( i
l
i
i xp , 
ii Xx , (i.e. the constraint 
0),( i
l
i
i xp  is satisfied as equality on 
iX ), then the set of optimal values of 
il
i  in 
(11) is given by 
0R . The converse is also true: if the set of optimal values of 
il
i  is 
given by 
0R , then 0),( i
l
i
i xp , 
ii Xx . Indeed, 0),( i
l
i
i xp  for some 
ii Xx  
would imply that the minimum value of )( ii  p,
  in (11) can be made arbitrary 
large, which is impossible for finite )(. psti . Likewise, from (13) it follows that if for 
some 
ii Ll   we have 0),( i
l
i
i xp , 
ii Xx , (i.e. the constraint 0),( i
l
i
i xp  is 
satisfied as a strong inequality on 
iX ), then the optimal value of 
il
i  in (11) is unique 
and given by 0ili . We note that if either 0),( i
l
i
i xp , 
iX ix , or 0),( i
l
i
i xp , 
ii Xx , then such a constraint makes no contribution to the producer i  uplift 
payment since it does not affect the producer profit. 
Clearly, (4) is equivalent to ),(),( ii
T
iiiN xpxp   with some 0),( ii xp , 
ii Xx ,  and some 0i  (for example, just one constraint ),(),( iiii N xpxp   with 
the multiplier 1i ). The set of equations (2) and (3) for ),( iiN xp  can be transformed 
to have the form of the optimization problem. Define the producer i  uplift payment 
as ),,(),,(max)( *iiiii
X
ii i
ii
U xpxpp,
x
 

. We have 0)( iiU p, , 
TRp , 0 i . 
Consider the optimization problem 
)(min
).(),,(max
,0
..
.
ii
ts
U
st
iiii
iXi
i
i




p,
pxp
x




.  (14) 
Using the definition of )(piM , (14) is expressed as: 
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),(min)()()(min
)(
*..
)(
*
ii
T
i
M
st
i
st
iii
M iiii
U xpppp,
pp

  


 . (15) 
The immediate consequence of (15) is that if 0xp ),( *ii , then 
)()(minarg
)(
pp,
p



 iiiM
MU
ii


, where )(p iM  denotes the boundary of )(p

iM . Thus, the 
minimum uplift problem for the given price p  and constraint vector function 
),( ii xp , 0),( 
*
ii xp , is reduced to the problem of finding a point on the boundary 
of )(piM  such that the hyperplane containing this point and having the normal 
vector ),(
*
ii xp  supports )(p

iM , or, equivalently, finding an element of the 
nonempty closed convex set )(piM  with the largest projection into the direction 
specified by the vector ),(
*
ii xp . We note that for a case of one function  ),( ii xp  
with 0),( *ii xp , the optimal point of (15) is unique and given by the maximum 
element of )(piM , i.e. 
max
i . We also note that 0),(min
)(


*
ii
T
i
M ii
xp
p


, which entails 
)()()(min *..
)(
ppp,
p
st
i
st
iii
M
U
ii


 
 
. Thus, addition of ),( ii
T
i xp  to the revenue 
function results in the lower (or equal) uplift. Clearly, the magnitude of the uplift 
reduction due to the introduction of ),( ii
T
i xp  in the producer revenue function 
essentially depends on the choice of ),( ii xp , which subsequently specifies the set 
p)(iM . For example, only the redundant constraints that satisfy 0),( ii xp , 
ii Xx , 0),( 
*
ii xp , }0{( 
 p)iM  may reduce the uplift. The necessary condition for a 
given vector function ),( ii xp  to yield zero uplift payment for the producer i  is 
formulated in the Appendix. 
Since 0)(min
)(


ii
M
U
ii


p,
p
, we conclude that 0)~( iiU p,  for some )(
~ p ii M  iff 
0)(min
)(


ii
M
U
ii


p,
p
 and )(minarg~
)(
ii
M
i U
ii


p,
p
 . Now we establish a relation between 
),( iiN xp , which satisfies the conditions (2) - (3), and solutions to (14) with some 
0),( ii xp , ii Xx , and 0i . 
Proposition 3. Let 0),( ii xp , iX ix , and 0i . The function 
),(),( ii
T
iiiN xpxp   satisfies the conditions (2) and (3) iff 0)( iiU p,  and 
)(p ii M . 
Proof. Let the conditions (2) and (3) hold for ),(),( ii
T
iiiN xpxp  , then (2) implies  
)(p ii M , while (3) yields 0)( iiU p, . Likewise, )(p
 ii M  yields (2). Also, both 
0)( iiU p,  and )(p
 ii M  entail 0)
~(min
(~


ii
M
U
ii


p,
p )
 and )~(minarg
(~
ii
M
i U
ii


p,
p )
 , which 
gives (3) for ),(),( ii
T
iiiN xpxp  . Proposition is proved. 
 
IV. Attaining zero uplift payment 
Now we formulate different forms of the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a given vector function 0),( ii xp , ii Xx , and a multiplier 0i  to produce 
zero uplift for generator i , i.e. for the corresponding ),(),( ii
T
iiiN xpxp   to satisfy 
the conditions (2) and (3). We note that (4) automatically holds for 
),(),( ii
T
iiiN xpxp  . 
10 
 
Proposition 4. A function ),( iiN xp  satisfies the conditions (2) - (4) iff 
),(),( ii
T
iiiN xpxp   for with some real-valued vector function 
||
:),( i
L
iii RX xp  
and some multiplier 0i  that satisfy 
 0),( ii xp , ii Xx ;     (16) 
  )()(),(
.*. ppxp  sti
st
i
*
ii
T
i  ;    (17) 
 )(),(),(
.. pxpxp  stii
st
iii
T
i  , ii Xx .  (18) 
Proof. Obviously, for a given ),(),( ii
T
iiiN xpxp   with 0i , the conditions (3) and 
(4) are equivalent to (17) and (16), respectively. Now we show that (2) holds iff (18) 
is satisfied, given the validity of (16) and (17). On one hand, if (2) holds with 
),(),( ii
T
iiiN xpxp  , then (18) is clearly satisfied. On the other hand, if (18) holds, 
then )],(),([max)( .. ii
T
ii
st
i
X
st
i
ii
xpxpp
x
 

  and (17) implies that this weak inequality 
is satisfied as equality resulting in (2). Proposition is proved. 
Example 1 
For a uninode single-period power market with a market price p , let us 
consider a generator that is offline in a given time interval according to the centralized 
dispatch solution, i.e. 0**  ii gu . Since 0
*. sti  for the offline unit, the generator uplift 
payment equals )(. psti
 , which is expressed as the generator revenue function 
amendment of the form )(
.
, *
pstixx ii
  with 0,0,, * iiii guxx
  . Using 
0,0,0, iii ugu
  , ii Xx  , and 
iu ui 10, , the amendment function is expressed as )()1(),(
. puxpN stiiii
  , which can 
be obtained from the redundant constraint 01iu  with the multiplier )(
. pstii
 . It 
can be easily verified that these constraint function and multiplier satisfy (16) – (18). 
Combining Propositions 3 and 4 we conclude that the following three 
statements are equivalent for 0),( ii xp , ii Xx , and 0
~ i : ),( ii xp  and i
~  satisfy 
(17) and (18); ),(~),( ii
T
iiiN xpxp   satisfies (2) - (3); 0)(min
)(


ii
M
U
ii


p,
p
 and 
)(minarg~
)(
ii
M
i U
ii


p,
p
 . 
We have proved that (16) - (18) are necessary and sufficient conditions for 
),(),( ii
T
iiiN xpxp   with 0i  to satisfy (2) - (4). Obviously, the choice for ),( iiN xp  
(and, therefore, for ),( ii xp  satisfying (16) and 0i ) is not unique. Moreover, both 
the function ),( ii xp  and the multiplier i  that satisfy (16) – (18) may depend on p . 
(We note that it is always possible to redefine ),( ii xp  so that the resulting i  is 
independent of p .) Also, it is the scalar product ),( ii
T
i xp , not the individual 
components il
i , ),( i
l
i
i xp , what matters for the uplift calculation.  
We note the three important corollaries of Proposition 4. First, if (17) and (18) hold 
for 0),( ii xp , iX ix , and 0i , and for some ii Ll   we have 0),( 
*
i
l
i
i xp , then the 
same  ),( ii xp  with i  modified by setting 0
il
i  also satisfies (17) and (18). Thus, 
components of ),( ii xp  that vanish at 
*
ii xx   can be excluded from consideration. 
Second, if (17) and (18) are satisfied by two different pairs }),,({ || siisi  xp : 
0),(| isi xp , ii Xx , 0| si , 2,1s , then so does }),,({ 3|3| iii  xp  with 13| i  and 
),(),(),(),(),( 2|2|21|1|13| ii
T
iiii
T
iiii xpxpxpxpxp   , for any functions ),( is xp : 
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RXR i
T   that satisfy 0),( is xp , 1),(
2,1

s
is xp , ii Xx . Clearly, 0),(3| ii xp , 
ii Xx . In short, any convex combination of such ),( ii
T
i xp  produces another 
solution for ),( ii xp  with 1i . 
Third, if for some set of the redundant constraints 0),(  ii xp , ii Xx , we have 
found p)( ii M , (i.e. the conditions (16) and (18) hold for ),( ii xp  and i ), and 
0),(  *ii
T
i xp , then the uplift payment is reduced but is non-zero unless (17) holds. 
Formally, this can be seen as follows. Let us add to ),( ii xp  an uplift term (i.e. a term 
proportional to *, ii xx
 ) that results in (17) while retaining (16) and (18). It is 
straightforward to verify that (16) - (18) hold for the same 0i  and  
ii
*
ii
T
i
st
i
st
iiiii  /)],()()([),(),(
.*.
, *
xpppxpxp
ii xx
  . (19) 
In this case, the function ),( iiN xp  is expressed as 
)],()()([),(),( *..
, *
*
ii
T
i
st
i
st
iii
T
iiiN xpppxpxp
ii xx
    with the second term having 
the form of the uplift payment in the amount of ),()()(
*.. *
ii
T
i
st
i
st
i xppp  

. Clearly, 
for 0),(  *ii
T
i xp  we have )()()()(),(0
*..*.. ppppxp sti
st
i
st
i
st
i
*
ii
T
i  

, 
which reflects the uplift payment reduction from adding ),( ii
T
i xp   to the producer 
revenue function. (Note that addition of ),( ii
T
i xp , with ),( ii xp  given by (19), 
reduces the uplift to zero.) As an illustration, let us observe that 0),(  ii xp , ii Xx , 
trivially satisfies (16) and (18) with any 0i . Utilization of (19) 
yields ii
st
ii
st
iii  /)](),([),(
.*.
, *
pxpxp
ii xx
  resulting in 
)],()([),( ..
, *
*
i
st
i
st
iiiN xppxp
ii xx
   , which is the revenue function amendment describing 
the original uplift payment. 
Let us denote as *
iL  a subset of iL  with 0),(
* i
l
i
i xp : }0),(,|{ **  i
l
iiiii
iLllL xp . 
This implies that only ),( i
l
i
i xp  with *
ii Ll   may contribute to the uplift. Clearly, 
ii LL 
* . Motivated by Proposition 7, given in Appendix, we have the following 
statement. 
Proposition 5. Let )(),( .*. pxp  stii
st
i  , 0i , and ii Ll   we have 0),( i
l
i
i xp , 
ii Xx , then (17) and (18) hold iff  
 0* iL ;                                     (20) 
 ),(/]),()(),([inf
,:
..
0
i
l
i
llLll
i
l
i
l
i
st
ii
st
i
X
l
i
i
iiiii
ii
il
i
i xpxppxp
x








, *\ iii LLl  ; (21) 
 ),(/]),()(),([min
,:
..
0
i
l
i
llLll
i
l
i
l
i
st
ii
st
i
X
l
i
i
iiiii
ii
il
i
i xpxppxp
x








, *
ii Ll  ;  (22) 
 ),(/]),()(),([minarg
,:
..*
0
i
l
i
llLll
i
l
i
l
i
st
ii
st
i
X
i
i
iiiii
ii
il
i
x xpxppxp
x








, *
ii Ll  .  (23) 
Proof. First, we show that, given the assumptions of the proposition, (17) and (18) 
imply (20) - (23). Indeed, )(),( .*. pxp  stii
st
i   and (17) entail (20). Also, (18) implies 
),(/]),()(),([inf
,:
..
0
i
l
i
llLll
i
l
i
l
i
st
ii
st
i
X
l
i
i
iiiii
ii
il
i
i xpxppxp
x








, ii Ll  , which entails (21) 
12 
 
*\ iii LLl  . For 
*
ii Ll  , (17) states that the infimum is attainable at 
*
ii xx   and, 
therefore, (29) and (30) hold. Second, we prove that under the stated assumptions (20) 
- (23) entail (17) – (18). Clearly, (21) and (22) give 
),(/]),()(),([inf
,:
..
0
i
l
i
llLll
i
l
i
l
i
st
ii
st
i
X
l
i
i
iiiii
ii
il
i
i xpxppxp
x








, ii Ll  , which implies 
)(),(),( .. pxpxp  stii
st
iii
T
i  , 
ii
il
iLl
i X  0x
. Since 0),( ii
T
i xp , 

ii
il
iLl
ii XX   0\ x
, we conclude that (18) holds. Due to (20) and (22), for some 
value of il  we have 
),(/]),()(),([min
,:
..
0
i
l
i
llLll
i
l
i
l
i
st
ii
st
i
X
l
i
i
iiiii
ii
il
i
i
i xpxppxp
x








,
),(/]),()(),([minarg
,:
..*
0
i
l
i
llLll
i
l
i
l
i
st
ii
st
i
X
i
i
iiiii
ii
il
i
i
x xpxppxp
x








, which entails (17). 
Proposition is proved. 
We note that to derive (17) from (20), (22), and (23) we needed validity of 
(22) and (23) for just one *
ii Ll  . This is because the set (21) – (23) is equivalent to the 
set of the following statements: (21) is valid for 
ii Ll  , (22) and (23) hold for some 
*
ii Ll  . 
Thus, Propositions 4, 5 give the necessary and sufficient conditions for a given 
0),( ii xp , ii Xx , and 0i  to yield zero uplift payment for the producer i . 
We also note that the different formulations of the redundant constraints 
generally result in the non-equivalent amendments of the generator revenue function. 
For example, the constraint set 0),(1 ii xp , 0),(
2 ii xp  is equivalent to 
0)],(),,(max[ 21 iiii xpxp  . However, the function )],(),,(max[
21
iiii xpxp   with 
some multiplier 0  generally cannot be expressed as ),(),( 2211 iiii xpxp    
with some multipliers 01  , 02  . In certain cases, the redundant constraint 
0)],(),,(max[ 21 iiii xpxp   satisfies (16) – (18) with some 0 , while the 
constraints 0),(1 ii xp , 0),(
2 ii xp  do not satisfy (16) – (18) for any 0
1  , 
02  . This is because the transition from a set of the constraints 0),(1 ii xp , 
0),(2 ii xp  to the equivalent constraint 0)],(),,(max[
21 iiii xpxp   is a nonlinear 
operation, while the considered amendment functions are linear in the redundant 
constraints. 
Clearly, just one appropriate redundant constraint is sufficient to obtain zero 
uplift payment for the generator i : for example, ),(),( iiii N xpxp   with the associated 
multiplier equal 1. Likewise, given a vector function ),( ii xp  and the associated 
vector of the non-negative multipliers 0i  that satisfy (16) – (18), just one 
redundant constraint of the form 0),(  ii
T
i xp  yields zero uplift payment for the 
producer.  
Moreover, in case of the uniform market price TRp  (which implies 
ii
st
iR gpxp
T. ),(  , Ii ), it suffices to introduce only one redundant constraint in (1) to 
obtain zero total uplift payment. Indeed, for a given set of ),( iiN xp , Ii , each 
satisfying (2) – (4), let us introduce the redundant constraint 0),( Ii iiN xp  in the 
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centralized dispatch optimization problem (1). Clearly, this constraint affects neither 
the value of (1) nor the set of its optimal points. Let us apply the Lagrangian 
relaxation procedure to both this constraint and the power balance constraint with the 
multipliers 0  and TRq , respectively. This yields 
 


Ii ii
Ii
ii
Ii
i NCL ),()()(),,( xpxg-dqxq
T  , which entails 
 



Ii iiii
Ii
i
st
i
XIiX
NfNL
iiii
),()],(),([max),,(min **.
,
xpxpxq-dqxq
x
T
x
 .  
For a given TRq and 0 , the total uplift payment is   
 



Ii iiIiX
iii
st
i
Ii
iii
st
i
X
NLfNN
iiii
),(),,(min)],(),()],(),([max[ *
,
***.. xpxpxpxpxpxq
xx
 . 
For pq   and 1 , (2) implies ),0,(min)(),1,(min
,
.
,
xpp-dpxp
x
T
x
LL
IiX
Ii
st
i
IiX iiii 


  . 
Consequently, the total uplift payment equals  
 

 
Ii iiIiX
iii
st
i
Ii
st
i NLfN
ii
),(),0,(min)],(),()([ *
,
***.. xpxpxpxpp
x
 , 
which is zero due to (3). 
If the uniform market price p  is obtained using the convex hull pricing method, 
then ),0,(min
,
* xp
x
Lf
IiX ii 
  is the original duality gap, but the total uplift payment 
no longer equals the duality gap and can be reduced to zero by utilizing the proper 
functions ),( iiN xp , Ii . We also note the following relation to the dual problem. 
From (4) it follows that ),(max)],(),([maxmin ..
0
i
st
i
X
iii
st
i
X iiii
N xqxpxq
xx

 
 , TRq , 
Ii . Therefore, 
),0,()],(),([maxmin
)],(),([maxmin),,(minmax),0,(
.
0
.
0,0
xqxpxq-
dqxpxq-dqxqxq
x
T
x
T
x
LN
NLL
ii
Ii
i
st
i
X
ii
Ii
i
st
i
XIiX
ii
iiii












. 
Thus, ),0,(minmax),,(minmaxmax
,,0
xqxq
xqxq
LL
IiXRIiXR ii
T
ii
T 


, and neither the value 
of the dual problem that is obtained from (1) by dualizing the power balance 
constraint nor the set of the optimal dual variables q  is affected by the introduction of 
the redundant constraint. Consequently, if the market price is set by the convex hull 
pricing method, then the redundant constraint 0),( Ii iiN xp  yields the same 
optimal set of the market prices and maximum values of the producer profit ),(. i
st
i xp , 
Ii ,  and results in zero total uplift payment. 
 
V. General form expression for ),( iiN xp  
We note that for a given p  the function ),( iiN xp  that satisfies (2) and (4) takes 
values between zero and the non-negative function ),()( .. i
st
i
st
i xpp  
 , while (3) 
fixes its value at *
ix  by )()(),(
*..* ppxp sti
st
iiiN  
 . Motivated by this observation 
we have the following general form expression for ),(),( ii
T
iiiN xpxp  . 
Proposition 6. The conditions (2) - (4) hold for ),( iiN xp  iff ),( iiN xp  satisfies 
)],()]()([);,()(min[),( *..
,
..
* ii
st
i
st
ii
st
i
st
iiiN xpppxppxp
ii xx
   , 
ii Xx , (24) 
with some non-negative real-valued function ),( ii xp : RXR i
T  , 0),( ii xp , 
ii Xx . 
14 
 
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that (24) satisfies (2) – (4). Now we show that (2) 
– (4) entail (24) with some function ),( ii xp : RXR i
T  , 0),( ii xp , ii Xx . 
Consider a function )]()([),(),( *..
, *
ppxpxp
ii xx
st
i
st
iiiii N  
 , 
ii Xx . Since 
),( iiN xp  satisfies (3) and (4), we have 0),( ii xp , ii Xx . From (2) we have 
),()(),( .. i
st
i
st
iiiN xppxp  
 , 
ii Xx ,  which gives 
)],();,()(min[),( .. iii
st
i
st
iii NN xpxppxp  
 , 
ii Xx . Using 
)]()([),(),( *..
, *
ppxpxp
ii xx
st
i
st
iiiiiN  
 , we obtain (24). Proposition is proved. 
From (24) we have the following general expression for the amended profit 
function 
)],()]()([),();(min[)( *..
,
..
* ii
st
i
st
ii
st
i
st
iii xpppxppxp,
ii xx
    (25) 
parameterized by the function ),( ii xp , which is non-negative on iX . From (25) it 
follows that the resulting amended profit function on 
iX  majorizes the function 
)]()([),( *..
,
.
* ppxp
ii xx
st
i
st
ii
st
i  
   and is bounded by )(. psti . The converse is also 
true: any function on 
iX  that majorizes )]()([),(
*..
,
.
* ppxp
ii xx
st
i
st
ii
st
i  
  and is 
bounded by )(. psti  satisfies (25) with some 0),( ii xp , ii Xx . It is worth 
mentioning that (24) implies (6). Now we study some forms of ),( ixpiN  generated by 
various choices of the parameter function ),( ixp . 
Example 2 
 Setting 0),( ii xp , ii Xx , in (24) gives )],()([),(
..
, *
*
i
st
i
st
iiiN xppxp
ii xx
   , 
which is the original uplift payment of ),()( *.. ixpp
st
i
st
i  
  recast in the form of the 
revenue function amendment.  
This expression for ),( iiN xp  can be easily obtained from the redundant 
constraint *,),( ii xx
xp  ii , which satisfies 0),( ii xp , ii Xx . Application of 
Proposition 7 gives ),()( *..max i
st
i
st
ii xpp  
 . Clearly, these ),( ii xp  and 
max
i  satisfy 
(16) – (18). Hence, )],()([),(
*..
, * i
st
i
st
iiiN xppxp
ii xx
     satisfies (2) – (4). 
Example 3 
Setting )],()()[1(),( ..
, * i
st
i
st
iii xppxp
ii xx
    in (24) results in 
),()(),( .. i
st
i
st
iiiN xppxp  
 , which implies )()( . pxp,  stiii  , ii Xx . In this case, the 
profit function becomes a constant independent of 
ix  and the producer is indifferent 
to its output volume. (If unacceptable, such a solution can be easily excluded by 
adding a condition that ),()(),( .. i
st
i
st
iiiN xppxp  
  for some 
ii Xx .) 
Example 4 
Let us utilize the freedom to choose an arbitrary (non-negative on 
iX ) function 
),( ii xp  in (25) to smooth the possible discontinuity of )( ii xp, , as a function of ix , 
introduced by the discontinuous term )]()([ *..
, *
pp
ii xx
st
i
st
i  
 . Consider the extended 
value function ),(. i
st
i xp  on }{ iXConv  defined as ),(),(
..
i
st
ii
st
i xpxp    for ii Xx  
and ),(. i
st
i xp  for iii XXConv \}{x . Let us choose 
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)]()([
),()]}()([),({),(
*..
,
.*..
,
.
}{
*
*
pp
xpppxpxp
ii
ii
xx
xx
st
i
st
i
i
st
i
st
i
st
ii
st
iXConvii i
conc






, 
 where 
}{ iXConv
conc  denotes the concave hull of a function on the set }{ iXConv . Clearly, 
0),( ii xp , ii Xx . Therefore, (25) entails 
)]}]()([),({);(min[)( *..
,
.
}{
.
* ppxppxp,
ii
xx
st
i
st
ii
st
iXConv
st
iii i
conc    . 
From )()]()([),( .*..
,
.
* pppxp
ii
xx
  sti
st
i
st
ii
st
i  , ii Xx , and 
)]}()([),({max)]}()([),({max *..
,
.
}{
*..
,
.
** ppxpppxp
iiii xxxxxx
st
i
st
ii
st
iXConv
X
st
i
st
ii
st
i
X iiiii
conc   



 we obtain )()]}()([),({ .*..
,
.
}{ * pppxp
ii
xx
  sti
st
i
st
ii
st
iXConv i
conc  , ii Xx . This 
results in  
)]}()([),({)( *..
,
.
}{ * ppxpxp,
ii xx
st
i
st
ii
st
iXConvii i
conc    , ii Xx . 
 Clearly, since the function )( ii xp,  is concave on }{ iXConv , it is continuous in ix  in 
the interior of }{ iXConv . For ii
st
iR gpxp
T. ),(  , it is straightforward to verify that 
}{ ii XConvx  we have 
)]}()([
)({)]}()([),({
*..
,
}{
T*..
,
.
}{
*
*
pp
xgpppxp
ii
ii
xx
xx
st
i
st
i
iiXConvi
st
i
st
ii
st
iXConv Cconvconc ii






,  
where )( iiC x  is the extended value function defined on }{ iXConv  as )()( iiii CC xx   
for 
ii Xx  and )( iiC x  for iii XXConv \}{x , and }{ iXConvconv  denotes the convex 
hull of a function on the set }{ iXConv . Therefore, in case of ii
st
iR gpxp
T. ),(  ,  we have 
)]}()([)({)( *..
,}{
T
* ppxgpxp,
ii
xx
st
i
st
iiiXConviii Cconv i  
 , 
ii Xx , (26) 
 which gives the following expression for ),( iiN xp : 
)]}()([)({)(),( *..
,}{ *
ppxxxp
ii xx
st
i
st
iiiXConviiii CconvCN i  

, 
ii Xx . (27) 
Clearly, (27) can be realized using one redundant constraint 
0)()]}()([)({ *..
,}{ *
  ii
st
i
st
iiiXConv CCconv i xppx ii xx
 , 
ii Xx , with the associated 
multiplier 1i . 
 
VI. Application to power markets with marginal pricing 
In the case of a power market with marginal pricing, p  is identified as the marginal 
price faced by the generator i  (the system marginal price or the locational marginal 
price at the generator node), and 
ii
st
iR gpxp
T. ),(  . Let us assume that for each fixed 
value of 
iu  both the generator private feasible set and the cost function are convex. 
For the market price p  and a given fixed vector of statuses Ti }1,0{u , let us introduce 
the maximum value of the generator i  profit ),(max. i
st
i up  : 
),(max),( .
.
,
..
max.
i
st
i
X
ts
i
st
i
ii
ii
i
xpup
uu
x
x



 . (28) 
The marginal pricing method entails 
),()( max.*. *upp i
st
i
st
i   . (29) 
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As it was mentioned above, the choice for ),( iiN xp  satisfying (2) – (4) is not unique. 
Below we provide two different expressions for ),( iiN xp , which originate from the 
two different sets of the redundant constraints. 
For each time instance },..,1{ Tt , we have the redundant inequality constraints 
on the status binary variable: 0tiu  and 01 
t
iu . Let us choose the constraint 
01  tiu  if 0
* tiu , and the constraint 0
t
iu  if 1
* tiu . Such a choice can be written 
as 0)1()( )1(
**
 
t
i
t
i ut
i
ut
i uu . Consider the redundant constraint that results from the product 
of these constraints for all the time instances: 0)( ii u , ii Xx , with 



},..,1{
)1( **
)1()()(
Tt
ut
i
ut
iii
t
i
t
i uuu . It is straightforward to check that 0)( ii u  if 
*
ii uu  , 
and 1)( ii u  if 
*
ii uu  . Therefore, *,)( ii uu
u  ii . Proposition 7 gives the value of 
the associated multiplier ),()( max..max *upp i
st
i
st
ii  
 . Using (29), we arrive at 
)()( *..max pp sti
st
ii  
 . Consequently, the redundant constraint *,)( ii uu
u  ii  and the 
associated multiplier maxi  satisfy (16) – (18). Thus, the conditions (2) – (4) hold for 
)]()([),( *..
, *
ppxp
ii uu
st
i
st
iiiN  

. Indeed, ),( iiN xp  is non-negative, has the right 
value at *
ii xx   and has no effect on the maximum value of the profit function: 
)(}),(max)()(;),(maxmax{)],(),([max ..
.
,
..
*...
.
,
..
. pxpppxpxpxp
** uu
x
x
uu
x
xx







 stii
st
i
X
ts
st
i
st
ii
st
i
X
ts
iii
st
i
X
ii
ii
i
ii
ii
iii
N  . 
We note that this expression for ),( iiN xp  can be obtained from (24) with 
)]()()[(),( *..
,, **
ppxp
iiii xxuu
st
i
st
iii  

. 
An alternative choice for a function ),( iiN xp  originates from a set of 
T2  redundant 
constraints parameterized by the vector of statuses ),...,( 1 Tii wwiw  with }1,0{
t
iw , 
},..,1{ Tt . Let 


},..,1{
)1(
)1()()(
Tt
wt
i
wt
ii
t
i
t
i
i
uuuw . Clearly, 0)( ii
i uw , ii Xx , 
T
i }1,0{w . 
These functions have the following properties, T
ii }1,0{,  wu : 
1)( ii
i uw   ii uw  ; 0)( ii
i uw   ii uw  ,  (30) 
which implies that )( ii
i uw  can be expressed as 
ii
i
ii wu
w u ,)(   . Define 
},|{
0 iiiii
XX
i
i
wuxxw  . We note that if for some 
T
i }1,0{w  all the points with 
ii wu   are infeasible in the generator private feasible set iX  (for example, due to 
initial conditions combined with minimum up/down time constraints), then 0
0

ii
X w . 
Let us denote as 
iW  the set of all 
T
i }1,0{w  with nonempty 0ii
X w . For ii Ww , 
Proposition 7 yields 
),(max)()],()([min .
,
..
,
...max
0
i
st
i
X
ts
st
ii
st
i
st
i
X
i
ii
i
ii
i
i
i xppxpp
wu
x
xx
w
w






 

. 
Using (28), we arrive at 
),()( max..
max
i
st
i
st
ii
i wppw    , 
ii Ww . (31) 
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Obviously, we have 0
max  ii
w , 
ii Ww . From (30) it follows that 0)()( 

iiii
ii uu ww  , 
T
iii }1,0{,,  wwu , ii ww  , which entails 000   iiii
XX ww

, 
T
ii }1,0{,  ww , ii ww  . 
Therefore, the conditions of Proposition 9 are met and we have 
||2
0
max
]),0[()( ii
ii
i
WT
i
W
RM




  w
w
p  . Hence, ii Ww , the functions )( ii
i uw  with the 
associated non-negative multipliers 
maxi
i
w  satisfy (16) and (18). It is straightforward 
to check that (17) is satisfied as well. Indeed, we have 
),()()( max..
maxmaxmax *u
w
w,u
w
w
*ww uppu
*
*
i
i
ii
ii
i
ii
i
ii st
i
st
ii
W
i
W
ii  




  , 
which, using (29), is transformed to )()()( *..max ppu
w
*ww st
i
st
i
W
ii
i
i
ii   

 . Therefore, 
(17) holds, and Proposition 4 entails that the introduction of the redundant constraints 
0)( ii
i uw , ii Ww , with ii
i
ii wu
w u ,)(   , and the associated multipliers 
maxi
i
w  given 
by (31) results in zero uplift payment. (We note that only the constraint )( ii
i uw  with 
*
ii uw   contributes to the uplift reduction, while the rest of )( ii
i uw  make no 
contribution to the uplift payment.) These constraints result in 
),()()(),( max..
max
ii
ii st
i
st
iW iiiii
N uppuxp
w
ww   

 , (32) 
and the amended profit function has the form 
),()(),(),( max...
iii
st
i
st
i
st
ii uppxpxp  

. It is straightforward to check that the 
expression (32) for ),( iiN xp  can be expressed in terms of (24) with  
)]()([),()(),( *..
,
max..
* ppuppxp
ii xx
st
i
st
i
st
i
st
iii i
   . 
We note that for the given market price p  and statuses of the unit, the new terms in 
the profit function are constant. In the case of one-period market model with no 
intertemporal constraints (ramp, minimum up/down time constraints, etc.), we have 
)1(0, iu ui  , iu ui 1, , which entails 
)1,()1,()0,()1(),( max.max.max.max. pupupuup stii
st
ii
st
iii
st
i   , 
where we used 0)0,(max. psti . This allows expressing (32) as 
)1,()(),( max.. pupxpN stii
st
iii  
 . Thus, if the generator has the lost profit (i.e. it is 
offline in the centralized dispatch solution, but operation at the given market price p  
would result in the profit 0)(.  psti ), then ),( ii xpN  compensates the generator for 
the lost profit )(. psti
  if it complies with the centralized dispatch solution. Likewise, 
if the generator operates at a loss (i.e. the generator is online in the centralized 
dispatch solution, but it is not recovering its cost at the given market price p  and, 
hence, would prefer to be offline), then 0)(.  psti , 0)1,(
max. psti . In this case, 
),( ii xpN  ensures that the generator receives zero profit and, as a result, fully recovers 
it cost if it follows the centralized dispatch. 
 
VII. Application to a producer with constant marginal cost of output in a 
single-period power market 
Consider a producer operating a generating unit without intertemporal constraints in 
a single-period power market. The producer is assumed to have the constant marginal 
cost of output a , start-up cost w , minimum/maximum capacity limit ming / maxg  with 
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maxmin0 gg  . Thus, the producer cost function has the form agwuxС )(  defined on 
the producer private feasible set },},1,0{|),{( maxmin uggugRguguX  . We 
consider the standard revenue function of the form pgxpRst ),(.  with the market price 
p , which is considered as being fixed by some pricing principle. Initially, the unit is 
assumed to be offline. Let ),( *** gux   denote the value of the producer status 
variable/output volume according to the centralized dispatch solution. We show that 
to construct the amendment function ),( xpN  that satisfies (2) - (4) it is sufficient to 
consider the following redundant constraints: 0min  gug , 0max ugg , 01u . (We 
note that this list of the redundant constraints is not exhaustive since there are the 
redundant constraints that are not expressed as some linear combination of these 
constraints, e.g. 0],max[ maxmin  ugggug .) Thus, we have 
)1()()(),( 3max2min1 uguguggxpN   . (33) 
If 0* g , then for max/ gwap   the uplift payment is zero and we set 
0321   . For 
max/ gwap  , from (13) we have 01  . Also, the constraint 
0max ugg  is satisfied as equality at 0* g  and, therefore, does not contribute to the 
uplift. Consequently, we set 02  . Thus, we are left with 01u . Proposition 7 gives 
)(.max3 pst   . It is straightforward to check that the redundant constraint and the 
multiplier satisfy (16) – (18), which results in )1)((),( . upxpN st   . In this case, the 
amended profit function is )1)(()(),( . upwugapxp st   . 
If min* gg  , then we set 031    as the corresponding constraints do not 
affect the uplift at *x . Proposition 7 entails )/()]()([ *max*..max2 ggpp stst    , which 
gives )/())](()([),( *maxmax*.. gggugppxpN stst     with the redundant constraint and 
the multiplier satisfying (16) – (18). The amended profit function is given 
by
)/()]()([)/()]()([)(),( *maxmax*..*max*.. ggugppgggppwugapxp stststst    .  
If max*min ggg  , then for max/ gwap   we have 03   as a consequence of 
(13). The conditions (17) – (18) give )/(),1,( minmaxmax.1 gggpst   , 
)/(),1,( minmaxmin.2 gggpst   . The resulting expression for the amendment 
function is ),(),( . xpxpN st , which corresponds to the redundant constraint 
0)(  wugap  and yields the identically zero amended profit function on X . In the 
case of max/ gwap  , from (13) we have 01  , while the constraint 01u  is 
satisfied as equality at *x  and makes no contribution to the uplift. Therefore, we set 
03  . Proposition 7 gives )(max2 ap  . These redundant constraints and the 
corresponding multipliers satisfy (16) – (18) and give ))((),( max gugapxpN  , which 
produces the amended profit function upxp st )(),( . . 
Likewise, if max* gg  , then for max/ gwap   the uplift is zero and no revenue 
function amendment is needed. For max/ gwap  , we have 03   from (13) and we 
also set 02   since 0max ugg  is satisfied as equality at *x . Proposition 7 gives 
)/()( minmax*.max1 ggpst    with wgappst  max*. )()(  resulting in 
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)/())((),( minmaxmin*. gguggpxpN st   . It is straightforward to verify that the 
conditions (16) – (18) hold, and the amended profit function is expressed 
as )/())(()(),( minmaxmin*. gguggpwugapxp st   . 
Let us construct the profit function amendments resulting from the application 
of (27). We define the extended value cost function )(xС  on }{XConv  as )()( xСxС   if 
Xx , and )(xС  if XXConvx \}{ . We have 
}//],,0[],1,0[|),{(}{ maxminmax ggugggguguXConv  . Let us introduce a function 
)]}()([)({)( *..
,}{ *
ppxCconvxf stst
xxXConv
    on }{XConvx . For }{XConvx , 
the function )(xf  defines a surface in 
3R  with coordinates ),,( fgu . It can be shown 
that (27) yields the same expressions for ),( xpN  as above except for the case 
max*min ggg  . In this instance, for }{XConvx  the function )(xf  corresponds to the 
highest of two planes in 3R  defined below. We have )](),(max[)( 21 xfxfxf   with 
)(1 xf  corresponding to the plane that contains the points )0,0,0( , ),,1(
minmin agwg  , 
)])()([,,1( *..** ppagwg stst     and )(2 xf  corresponding to the plane that 
contains the points )0,0,0( , )])()([,,1( *..** ppagwg stst    , ),,1( maxmax agwg  . 
The straightforward computation gives 
)/())](()([)( min*min*..1 gggugppagwuxf
stst    , 
)/())](()([)( *maxmax*..2 gguggppagwuxf
stst    . 
This entails  
)]/()();/()min[()]()([),( *maxmaxmin*min*.. ggguggguggppxpN stst    , (34) 
which can be obtained from the redundant constraint 
0)]/()();/()max[( *maxmaxmin*min  ggugggggug  with the multiplier 
)()( *.. pp stst    . For max/ gwap  , the resulting amended profit function has the 
form )/())(](0;min[)(),( min*minmax*. ggggapuggpuxp st   . For max/ gwap  , 
we have )]/(),,1()();/(),,1()min[(),( *maxmax.*min*min.* gggpugggggpgugxp stst   . 
It is illustrative to repeat the analysis when the status variable u  is expressed in 
terms of the output volume g  as )(gu   and is excluded from the consideration. In 
this case, the private feasible set of the generator is expressed as 
]},[}0{|{ maxmin ggggG  , while the cost function is )(),( gwaggpC  . We also have 
}0|{}{ maxgggGConv  . The analysis above implies that to construct the amendment 
function ),( gpN  that yields zero uplift payment it is sufficient to consider the 
redundant constraints 0)( min  ggg , 0)( max  ggg  , 01)( g . Such an approach 
gives )](1[])([])([),( 3max2min1 gggggggxpN    with the same values of the 
multipliers 1 , 2 , 3  as in (33).  
Application of (27) results in the following expressions for the functions 
),( gpN  and ),( gp . 
If 0* g , then for max/ gwap   the uplift payment is not needed. For max/ gwap  , 
we have ),()(),( .. gppgpN stst    , which can be obtained from the redundant 
constraint )(),( .. pgp stst  . The resulting amended profit function has the form 
)(),( . pgp st   and is constant. 
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If min* gg  , then for max/ gwap   we have ),()()(),( .. gpgpgpN stst    , which is 
associated with  the redundant constraint )()(),( .. gpgp stst   . For the amended 
profit function we have )()(),( . gpgp st   . In the case of max/ gwap  , the 
calculation gives )/(),())((),( minmaxmin.max gggpggggpN st   , which can be obtained 
from the redundant constraint  max)( ggg  . (We note that the presence of )(g  is 
critical in this constraint since the redundant constraint maxgg   makes no contribution 
to the uplift payment as the associated multiplier is zero due to (13).) In this case, we 
have }0);/(),()min{(),( minmaxmax.min gggpgggp st   . 
If max*min ggg  , then in the case of max/ gwap   we have 
)],()(;/]})([)]()([min[{),( ..***.. gppggggwppggpN stststst    , which 
corresponds to the redundant constraint 
0)](),(;/]})([)]()([max[{ ..**.*.   pgpggggwppg stststst  . This constraint is 
equivalent to the set of the redundant constraints 
0/]})([)]()([{ **.*.   ggggwppg stst  , which can be transformed to 0max  gg , and 
0)(),( ..   pgp stst  . (However, as we noted in Section IV, the equivalent set of 
constraints may result in the different amendment function.) The amended profit 
function is **. /];min[)(),( gggpgp st  . For max/ gwap  , we have 
)]/(]})([)],(),([{);,(min[),( *maxmaxmax..*. gggggwgpgpggpgpN ststst   , (35) 
which is associated with the redundant constraint 0),(  gpN . (We note that the 
constraint 0),(  gpN  is equivalent to the set of the redundant constraints 0),(. gpst  
and 0])([)],(),([ max.max.*  gggwgpgpg stst  .) The amended profit function is given 
by ]0);/())(,(min[),( *max*max. gggggpgp st   . 
If max* gg  , then for max/ gwap   the uplift payment is not needed. For 
max/ gwap  , we have ),(),( . gpgpN st , which corresponds to the redundant 
constraint 0),(. gpst . The resulting amended profit function is identically zero. 
 
VIII. Numerical example 
In this section we apply the amended profit function expressions (27) and (33) for 
the Scarf example [5] (adapted according to [22]), which describes the uninode single-
period power market with fixed demand and three types of the power plants 
(“Smokestack”, “High Tech”, and “Med Tech”) with the constant marginal costs of 
output. The unit parameters are given below. 
Table 1. Characteristics of the generating units 
 Minimum 
capacity 
limit, MW 
Maximum 
capacity 
limit, MW 
Marginal 
cost of 
output, 
$/MW 
Start-up 
cost, $  
Smokestack 0 16 3 53 
High Tech 0 7 2 30 
Med Tech 2 6 7 0 
 
It is assumed that the power system has 6, 5, and 5 units of each type, respectively. 
Initially, all the units are offline. We consider two scenarios with demand equal 10 
MWh and 40 MWh, respectively, with the standard revenue function of the form 
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pgxpRst ),(. . We apply the convex hull pricing mechanism [20]-[22] to set the market 
price. The centralized dispatch outcomes and the market prices are given below, [22]. 
Table 2. Dispatch and pricing outcome 
 Smokestack High Tech Med Tech Market 
price 
CHPp , 
$/MWh 
Total 
uplift, $ Demand, 
MWh 
Number 
of units 
online 
Each 
unit 
output, 
MWh 
Number 
of units 
online 
Each 
unit 
output, 
MWh 
Number 
of units 
online 
Each 
unit 
output, 
MWh 
10  0 0 1 7 1 3 6.2857 2.143 
40  1 16 3 7 1 3 6.3125 2.438 
 
If demand is 10 MWh, then the online High Tech unit sets the market price, and the 
uplift payment is made only to the operating Med Tech unit to compensate its output 
cost. Thus, 1* MTu , 3
* MTg , 143.2$)(
*. CHP
st
MT p , 0
..   stMT
st
MT gu , 0$)(
.  CHP
st
MT p .  
The application of (27) gives the following. From (34) we obtain the 
amendment function 
]3/2;2min[143.2),( MTMTMTMTMTCHPMT guugxpN  , 
which reaches its maximum value (equal the uplift payment of $2.143) at 1* MTu , 
3* MTg , and vanishes at 0 MTMT gu , which is the optimal point of ),(
.
MTCHP
st
MT xp . It 
is straightforward to check that 0),( MTCHPMT xpN , MTMT Xx  , and such a choice for 
),( MTCHPMT xpN  can be realized by the introduction of the redundant constraint 
0]3/2;2min[  MTMTMTMT guug  with the associated multiplier 143.2 . The 
resulting amended profit function is 
|3|429.1]3;3min[429.1),( MTMTMTMTMTMTMTCHPMT ugguugxp  . 
It is illustrative to consider the outcome of (27) if the private feasible set of a 
Med Tech unit is described using the output variable only. From (35) we 
obtain ]6;min[714.0),( MTMTMTCHPMT gggpN  . This expression for ),( MTCHPMT gpN  
corresponds to the redundant constraint 0]6;min[  MTMT gg , which is equivalent to 
the set of the redundant constraints 
MTg0 , 6MTg . The resulting amended profit 
function is given by ]0;3min[143.2),( MTMTCHPMT ggp  . 
The alternative amendment function can be obtained from (33), which yields 
the redundant constraints 02  MTMT gu  and 06  MTMT ug  with the multipliers 
equal 1.071 and 0.357, respectively. The resulting amendment function equals 
),(. MTCHP
st
MT xp  and produces identically zero amended profit function. 
Now, we consider a scenario with demand equal 40 MWh. Without the uplift 
payment, the online Med Tech unit has a loss of $2.063 and each of the two offline 
High Tech units has the lost profit in the amount of $0.188. First, let us consider the 
online Med Tech. The application of (27) for the formulation involving the private 
feasible set 
MTX  is given by (34), which yields 
]3/2;2min[063.2),( MTMTMTMTMTCHPMT guugxpN  . (This expression for the amendment 
function ),( MTCHPMT xpN  can be obtained from the redundant constraint 
0]3/2;2min[  MTMTMTMT guug .) The corresponding amended profit function is 
expressed as |3|375.1),( MTMTMTCHPMT ugxp  . In case of the private feasible set 
MTG , (27) gives ]6;min[688.0),( MTMTMTCHPMT gggpN  . We note that this expression 
for ),( MTCHPMT gpN  can be obtained from the redundant constraint 0]6;min[  MTMT gg , 
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which is equivalent to the redundant constraints MTg0 , 6MTg  belonging to the 
private feasible set of the Med Tech unit. The amended profit function is expressed as 
]375.1126.4;0min[),( MTMTCHPMT ggp  . Another choice for the amendment function is 
given by (33), which entails )6(344.0)2(031.1),( MTMTMTMTMTCHPMT guugxpN   with 
identically zero amended profit function. 
 For the High Tech unit, the application of both (27) and (33) for the producer 
private feasible set formulated as 
HTX  yields )1(188,0),( HTHTCHPHT uxpN   
and HTHTHTCHPHT ugxp 188.30313.4188,0),(  . An alternative choice for the amendment 
function is given by (27) for the case of the private feasible set 
HTG . We have 
HTHTHTCHPHT gggpN 313.4)(30188.0),(   , which can be deduced from the redundant 
constraint 0)(),( ..   CHP
st
HTHTCHP
st
HT pgp  . The resulting amended profit function is 
constant on 
HTG  and equals 0.188. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
We considered the possibly non-linear redundant constraints that stay redundant 
if the power balance constraint is excluded from the constraint set of the centralized 
dispatch optimization problem and showed that the introduction of this type of the 
redundant constraints leaves the duality gap unaffected. For each producer, we studied 
the redundant constraints that are satisfied on its private feasible set and proved that 
any set of the redundant constraints, which belong to this special type, corresponds to 
the producer revenue function amendment that is non-negative (on the producer 
private feasible set) and leaves the maximum profit of the producer unaffected. 
Likewise, for any such amendment function, one can indicate (generally non-unique) 
set of the redundant constraints. Consequently, the uplift payment is potentially 
lowered by the introduction of these constraints.  
We studied the properties of the redundant constraints and formulated necessary 
and sufficient conditions for a given set of the redundant constraints and the 
associated multipliers to yield zero uplift payment. For each producer, we explicitly 
construct the general expression for the producer revenue function amendment that is 
non-negative on the producer private feasible set, leaves the maximum profit of the 
producer unaffected, and results in zero uplift payment for the market player. This 
allows identifying the family of the redundant constraints that corresponds to the 
revenue function amendment of the producer and yields zero uplift payment for this 
market player. In case of the uniform price for power, we constructed one universal 
redundant constraint (given by the sum of these properly rescaled individual 
redundant constraints) that could be introduced directly in the centralized dispatch 
optimization problem to yield zero total uplift payment after the Lagrangian relaxation 
procedure is applied to both this constraint and the power balance constraint. 
Thus, in the case of a uniform market price, it suffices to introduce just one 
redundant constraint in the centralized dispatch optimization problem to eliminate all 
the uplift payments. If the uniform market price is set using the convex hull pricing 
method, the set of the market prices and each producer maximum profit are unaffected 
by the redundant constraint. 
 
Appendix 
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In this section we study the properties of the redundant constraints and 
establish a necessary condition for a given set of the redundant constraints to yield 
zero uplift payment for the producer i . For 
ii Ll  , consider an optimization problem  
)],(),([maxmin)( .
,0
.
i
l
i
l
ii
st
i
X
st
i
ii
ii
il
i
xpxpp
x




 .     (36) 
Let us define the corresponding set of minimizers 
)],(),([maxminarg)( .
,0
i
l
i
l
ii
st
i
X
l
i
ii
ii
il
i
iM xpxpp
x




 . Clearly, )(pi
l
iM

 is a closed convex set 
and )(}0{ pi
l
iM
 . Since 0)( 
 RM ili p , we have the following three possibilities for the 
set )(piliM

: }0{)( 
 piliM , or ],0[)( aM
il
i 
 p  with some 
0Ra , or 0)( 
  RM ili p . 
Obviously, if 0),( i
l
i
i xp , 
ii Xx , then }0{)( 
 piliM , while 0),( i
l
i
i xp , 
ii Xx , 
entails  0)( 
  RM ili p . Let us denote by iL  the subset of iL  with bounded )(p
il
iM

. Thus, 
ii Ll   we have 0),( i
l
i
i xp , 
ii Xx , and 0),( i
l
i
i xp  for some  
ii Xx , which 
means that a set }0),(,|{
0

 i
l
iiii
i
il
i
XX xpxx 

 is nonempty. For 
ii Ll  , let 
maxil
i
  
denote the maximum element of )(piliM

. The following statement gives a 
straightforward way to calculate 
maxil
i
  under some simplifying technical assumption.  
Proposition 7. If for 
ii Ll   the function ),(/)](),([
..
i
l
i
st
ii
st
i
i xppxp    has a minimum 
value on 
0i
l
i
X

, then 
),(/)](),([min ..
max
0
i
l
i
st
ii
st
i
X
l
i
i
il
i
i
i xppxp
x




 

. (37) 
Proof. Let )(pii
l
i
l
i M
  , then (36) implies )(),(),( .. pxpxp   stii
st
ii
l
i
l
i
ii  , 
ii Xx , 
which entails ),(/)](),([min ..
0
i
l
i
st
ii
st
i
X
l
i
i
il
i
i
i xppxp
x




 

. Let 
),(/)](),([min ..
0
i
l
i
st
ii
st
i
X
l
i
i
il
i
i
i xppxp
x






. Thus, ii
l
i
l
i
  , )(pii li
l
i M
  . Now, we show 
that )(pii
l
i
l
i M
 . For ),(/)](),([minarg ..
0
i
l
i
st
ii
st
i
X
i
i
il
i
i
xppxpx
x






, we have 
),(),()( .. i
l
i
l
ii
st
i
st
i
ii xpxpp   . Since ),(),()( .. i
l
i
l
ii
st
i
st
i
ii xpxpp   , 
ii Xx , we 
conclude that )],(),([max)( .. i
l
i
l
ii
st
i
X
st
i
ii
ii
xpxpp
x
 

  and )(pii
l
i
l
i M
 . Therefore, 
ii l
i
l
i  
 max
. Proposition is proved. 
We note that if 0),( st.li i
i xp , 
ii Ll  , then (37) yields 0
max  ili , which agrees 
with (13). Also, if 0),( *li i
i xp , 
ii Ll  , then (37) implies 
),(/)]()([ .*.
max *
i
l
i
st
i
st
i
l
i
ii xppp    , which entails )()(),( .*.max ppxp   sti
st
i
*
i
l
i
l
i
ii  . 
Therefore, if )(pii
l
i
l
i M
  , then ili
  and ),(
i
il
i xp  satisfy (16) and (18). However, if 
(17) holds for )(pii
l
i
l
i M
   and ),(
i
il
i xp , ii Ll  , then 
maxii l
i
l
i
   . The following 
statement gives a relation between )(piM  and the sets )(p
il
iM

.  
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 Therefore, a set )(piM  is a subset of an || iL -dimensional box )(p
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)(pi  the convex hull of the points )0,..,0,,0,...,0(
maxil
i
 , 
ii Ll  , and )0,...,0( . In this case, 
since )(p
i
M  is a convex set, we have )()( pp 
i
Mi . For example, if all ),( ixp
il
i
  are 
identical with nonempty 
0
 il
i
X

, then )(p
i
M  is bounded and )()( pp 
i
Mi .  
Now we are ready to formulate the necessary condition that holds if a vector 
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Proposition is proved. 
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